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Abstract
We analyse whether central bank independence (CBI) affects inflation in developing countries. For
this purpose we have constructed a new data set for the turnover rate (TOR) of central bank governors
for a very large sample of countries, which also covers the 1990s. We find that once various control
variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those
regressions in which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only
after high inflation countries are added to the sample.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays it is widely believed that a high level of central bank independence (CBI) coupled with some
explicit mandate for the bank to restrain inflation are important institutional devices t o assure price
stability. The evidence in support of this view generally consists of cross-country regressions using
proxies for CBI which are generally based on the statutes of the central bank (see Eijffinger and De Haan,
1996 and Berger et al., 2001 for surveys). Popular as the view referred to above may be, the empirical
literature on the effects of central bank independence recently came under attack.
Firstly, the relevance of independence measures which are based on regulations on the position
of the central bank is disputed if it comes to testing whether CBI is conducive to lower inflation (see e.g.
Forder, 1996). Indeed, legal indices of central bank independence are often incomplete and noisy
indicators of actual independence as laws cannot specify explicitly the limits of authority between central
banks and the political authorities under all contingencies. And even when the laws are quite explicit,
actual practice may deviate from them. Cukierman (1992) argues that legal independence measures may
be a better proxy for actual independence in industrial countries than in developing countries. As an
alternative, Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) therefore developed a yardstick for central
bank autonomy, which is not based on central bank laws but on the actual average term of office of the
central bank governor. This indicator is based on the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a
higher turnover of central bank governors indicates a lower level of independence. So far, quite a few
studies have used this turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) as indicator for CBI and conclude
that there is a clear relationship between the TOR and the inflation performance of developing countries.
One drawback of this literature is that almost all studies are based on the data provided by Cukierman
(1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) as this was the only data set available.
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Secondly, various authors have questioned whether CBI really matters, once other variables that
may influence inflation are taken into account. For instance, using data for developing countries
Campillo and Miron (1997) conclude that CBI plays no role in determining inflation outcomes, once
other factors are held constant. They find that instead openness, political instability and proxies for
government policy distortions are robustly related to inflation.
2 This conclusion may be criticised, as
Campillo and Miron (1997) employ a legal indicator for CBI, which most previous studies have found to
be unreliable for developing countries.
Thirdly, a few studies have sounded a warning that conclusions on the relationship between CBI
and inflation are highly sensitive to influential observations. For instance, Temple (1998) finds that if high
inflation countries are added to his sample of OECD and developing countries, the effect of CBI (proxied
by Cukierman's (1992) legal index) on inflation disappears.
We employ a new data set for the turnover rate of central bank governors, which covers almost
twice as many countries as the Cukierman data set and - in contrast to Cukierman's data set  - also covers
the 1990s. We use bivariate and multivariate cross-country models for inflation. We  find that once3
various control variables are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. Following the approach
suggested by Temple (1998), we also conclude that in those regressions in which the CBI proxy is
significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high inflation countries are
added to the sample.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and our data.
Section 3 offers our results. The final section contains some concluding comments.
2. The model and the data
Following Cukierman et al. (1992) we have used the transformed inflation rate D as dependent
variable in order to reduce heteroscedasticity of the error in the regressions. D is defined as the
inflation rate (p) divided by one plus the inflation rate:
D = p/(1 + p) (1)
So the transformed inflation rate (if positive) takes a value from 0 to 1. When inflation is 100% (p=1),
D is 0.5. D has been calculated for each year, and subsequently the averages for the various estimation
periods have been calculated as the simple means of these annual observations. The inflation rate is
taken from the World Bank’s 2000 World Development Indicators CD-rom.
One serious drawback of many studies on the relationship between inflation and CBI is that
control variables are often lacking. Following Campillo and Miron (1997), we therefore also estimate
multivariate models. We include apart from indicators for CBI and openness (export and import as share
of GDP), also political instability (proxied by the number of government transfers), the log of GDP per
capita, a dummy for the exchange rate regime (one in case of a more or less fixed exchange rate) and the
debt-to-GDP ratio as control variables.
Our indicator for openness (OPEN, defined as sum of export and import in relation to GDP)
and the log of the level of GDP per capita (GDPCAP) are from the World Bank’s  2000 World
Development Indicators CD-rom. Our proxy for political instability (PI, defined as the total number of
government transfers) is from the new World Bank data set of political indicators.
3 An exchange rate
dummy - which is one if the country had at the beginning and the end of the period a more or less
fixed exchange rate regime - is used to examine the impact of the exchange rate regime. This variable
is denoted as XRATE. It is constructed using information reported in the IMF's Annual Report. The
external debt-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the estimation period (DEBT) is also from the World
Bank. So the estimated cross-section model is:
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D = c0 + c1CBI + c2OPEN + c3GDPCAP + c4PI + c5XRATE + c6DEBT (2)4
We use indicators for central bank independence based on the turnover rate of central bank governors.
Apart from the TOR as provided by Cukierman et al. (1992), we employ a new data set.
5 Based on
information gathered from central banks and the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) we have
constructed the turnover rate of the central bank governors in more than 80 developing countries for
various sample periods. To enable comparison with the data of Cukierman (1992), we calculated the
turnover rates for two periods: 1980-1989 and 1990-1998.
6 For the first period Cukierman (1992) also
provides turnover rates, albeit for a substantially smaller sample of countries. Detailed information is
shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3. Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries
We focus on the relationship between CBI and inflation in developing countries for two periods: 1980-
1989 and 1990-1998. The first period is chosen on the basis of the availability of the data of Cukierman
(1992). We not only estimate simple bivariate regressions, but following Campillo and Miron (1997) also
estimate models that include various control variables (see Section 2). Unfortunately, this reduces the
number of observations.
We start with the simple bivariate model using our new data set for the TOR. Row 1 of table 1
shows the OLS estimation results for the period 1980-89. The coefficient of the TOR is highly significant.
The same results show up when we employ Cukierman's TOR (row 2 of table 1). Also for the period
1990-98 the coefficient of our CBI proxy differs significantly from zero. These results are very much in
line with almost all previous studies, which found that there is a clearly significant positive
relationship between the TOR and inflation in developing countries.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We checked whether the relationship between inflation and CBI is linear using the RESET (Regression
Error Specification Test). This test means regressing the in-sample residuals on the same regressors as in
the original linear regression and on powers of the in-sample forecasts and testing for the joint
significance of the coefficients performing an F-test (see e.g. Granger and Terasvita, 1993).
7 These tests
clearly lead to the conclusion that the relationship is linear.
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Next, we checked for the influence of high inflation countries. A very simple way to visualise the
role of these countries - as suggested by Temple (1998) - is to order the countries according to their level
of inflation and then add countries one by one to the sample. Figure 1 shows the estimated coefficients
and the band of plus and minus two times the standard error for the regressions reported in rows 1-3 of
table 1. The figures clearly show that only after the high inflation countries are included in the sample, the5
coefficient of the TOR index becomes significant. In other words, the conclusion that CBI matters for
inflation is driven by a limited number of observations.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Next, we turn to the multivariate models. The lower part of table 1 presents the regressions. As we are
mainly interested in the effect of CBI on inflation, we only report the estimated coefficients for the TOR.
9
It follows that in the regression for the period 1980-89 the coefficient of our proxy for CBI is not
significantly different from zero (row 4 of table 1). When we use Cukierman's TOR instead, its coefficient
is significantly different from zero, although only at the 10 per cent level (row 5). For the 1990s we do not
find a significant effect of our TOR on inflation for the multivariate model (row 6). The variables that turn
out to be significant in all regressions are openness, the exchange rate regime (except in the regression
with Cukierman’s TOR) and the debt ratio (see table A2 in the Appendix).
Figure 2 shows the estimated coefficients and the band of plus and minus two times the standard
error for the regressions reported in rows 4-6 of table 1. Again, it clearly follows that Cukierman's TOR
only becomes significant once high inflation countries are added to the sample. Although the coefficients
of our proxy for CBI never become significant, the same important role of high inflation observations can
be discerned.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in
developing countries. We extend the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, we present a new data
set for the turnover rate of central bank governors in a very large sample of countries, which also
covers the 1990s. Secondly, we employ turnover rates in a multivariate model. Previous studies which
used control variables (notably Campillo and Miron, 1997 and Temple, 1998) employed legal
indicators for CBI, which are widely believed to be less relevant for developing countries. Third, we
examined the role of high inflation countries, following the approach suggested by Temple (1998).
Our results are in sharp contrast to most previous studies as we find that once various control variables
are included, the CBI proxy is often not significant. We also conclude that in those regressions in
which the CBI proxy is significant, the coefficient of the TOR becomes significant only after high
inflation countries are added to the sample.6
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Table 1. OLS regressions for the relationship between CBI and inflation
Period and CBI proxy: CBI coefficient t-statistic R2 (adj.) No. obs
Bivariate models
(1) 1980-89; new TOR 30.55 2.57 *** 0.20 76
(2) 1980-89; Cukierman TOR 41.26 3.01 ** 0.22 45
(3) 1990-98; new TOR 23.26 2.30 ** 0.11 76
Multivariate models
(4) 1980-89; new TOR 14.61 1.33 0.46 55
(5) 1980-89; Cukierman TOR 24.04 1.70 * 0.53 29
(6) 1990-98; new TOR 15.34 1.52 0.27 63
Note: heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios (White, 1980). In the regressions for the multivariate model
political instability, openness, the log of GDP per capita, a dummy for the exchange rate regime and the
debt-to-GDP ratio are included as control variables. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
levels, respectively.8
Figure 1: Rolling regressions for the bivariate relationship between CBI and inflation
Bivariate
1980-89; new TOR






























Figure 2: Rolling regressions for the multivariate relationship between CBI and inflation
Multivariate
1980-89; new TOR
































Table A1. Turnover rates of central bank governors, 1980-89 and 1990-98.
Country Cukierman 1980-89 New 1980-89 New 1990-98
Algeria NA 0.30 0.00
Argentina 1.00 1.00 0.25
Bahamas 0.20 0.10 0.25
Bahrain NA 0.00 0.00
Bangladesh NA 0.20 0.25
Barbados 0.10 0.20 0.25
Belize NA 0.30 0.00
Botswana 0.40 0.10 0.25
Brazil 0.80 1.10 0.75
Burundi NA 0.20 0.00
Cape Verde NA 0.10 0.00
Chile 0.80 0.40 0.25
China 0.30 NA NA
Colombia 0.20 0.20 0.00
Costa Rica 0.40 0.30 0.50
Cyprus NA 0.00 0.00
Djibouti NA 0.10 0.25
Dom Rep. NA 0.60 0.00
Ecuador NA 0.70 0.75
Egypt 0.30 0.30 0.00
El Salvador NA 0.30 0.25
Ethiopia 0.10 0.20 0.50
Fiji NA 0.10 0.00
Gambia NA 0.30 0.00
Ghana 0.20 0.10 0.25
Greece 0.20 0.30 0.00
Guatemala NA 0.80 0.25
Guinea NA 0.10 0.25
Guinea Bissau NA 0.10 0.50
Haiti NA 1.00 0.25
Honduras 0.10 0.20 0.25
Hungary 0.10 NA NA11
Country Cukierman 1980-89 New 1980-89 New 1990-98
India 0.30 0.40 0.25
Indonesia 0.20 0.20 0.25
Iran NA 0.30 0.00
Israel 0.20 NA NA
Jamaica NA 0.50 0.25
Jordan NA 0.20 0.25
Kenya 0.20 0.20 0.00
Korea South 0.50 0.40 0.50
Kuwait NA 0.10 0.00
Lebanon 0.10 0.20 0.00
Lesotho NA 0.20 0.25
Libya NA 0.30 0.25
Madagascar NA 0.20 0.25
Malawi NA 0.30 0.25
Malaysia NA 0.20 0.25
Maldives 0.20 0.00 0.00
Malta 0.20 0.20 0.25
Mauritius NA 0.00 0.25
Mexico 0.30 0.00 0.25
Morocco 0.20 0.20 0.00
Mozambique NA 0.20 0.00
Nepal 0.10 0.20 0.25
Nicaragua 0.40 0.50 0.25
Nigeria 0.10 0.10 0.00
Pakistan 0.30 0.50 0.00
Panama 0.20 NA NA
Paraguay NA 0.30 0.50
Peru 0.30 0.50 0.00
Philippines 0.20 0.20 0.00
Poland 0.50 NA NA
Portugal 0.30 NA NA
Qatar 0.00 0.10 0.00
Romania 0.20 NA NA
Saudi Arabia NA 0.00 0.00
Seychelles NA 0.10 0.2512
Country Cukierman 1980-89 New 1980-89 New 1990-98
Singapore 0.60 0.30 0.25
Solomon Islands NA 0.10 0.00
South Africa 0.20 0.10 0.00
Sri Lanka NA 0.20 0.25
Sudan NA 0.44 0.50
Surinam NA 0.20 0.25
Swaziland NA 0.10 0.25
Syria NA 0.10 0.25
Taiwan 0.20 NA NA
Tanzania 0.10 0.20 0.25
Thailand 0.10 0.10 0.75
Trin & Tobago NA 0.20 0.25
Tunisia NA 0.30 0.00
Turkey 0.40 0.30 0.25
Uganda 0.20 0.20 0.00
Uruguay 0.30 0.30 0.50
Vanuatu NA 0.40 0.25
Venezuela 0.50 0.50 0.00
Western Samoa 0.56 0.20 0.00
Yugoslavia 0.20 NA NA
Zaire 0.20 0.30 NA
Zambia 0.50 0.40 0.25
Zimbabwe 0.10 0.10 0.0013
Table A2. Multivariate cross-country models of inflation in developing countries
Variable: new TOR Cukierman TOR new TOR
1980-89 1980-89 1990-98
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Constant -14.30 (-1.39) -15.15 (-1.02) 4.92 (0.56)
CBI 14.61 (1.33) 24.04 (1.70) 15.34 (1.52)
GDPCAP 3.82 (2.30) 5.40 (2.17) 1.88 (1.36)
OPEN -0.13 (-2.56) -0.40 (-3.91) -0.09 (-2.77)
PI 16.15 (1.15) 6.04 (0.21) -2.14 (-0.25)
XRATE -5.17 (-2.00) -1.08 (-0.23) -7.15 (-3.24)
DEBT 0.16 (5.70) 0.16 (3.97) 0.04 (3.65)
No. obs. 55 29 63
R2 (adj.) 0.46 0.53 0.2714
Notes
                                                
1 Furthermore, the Cukierman data refer to a small sample of countries only.
2 Their results on openness confirm earlier findings of Romer (1993), who argues that monetary surprises
cause the real exchange rate to depreciate, and since real depreciations has the most harmful effects in
more open economies, the benefits of unexpected inflation are a decreasing function of the degree of
openness. In the absence of binding pre-commitments, monetary authorities in more open economies are
therefore expected to expand less on average.
3 See Beck et al. (1999). The variable we use is labeled STABNS2 that is defined as the percent of
veto players who drop from the government in any given year. Veto players are the president, the
largest government party, and the largest party in the Senate; for parliamentary systems, veto players
are defined as the Prime Minister and the biggest three coalition members.  If there is no legislature, an
unelected legislature, only 1 candidate, or 1 party to choose from during elections this index is based
only on changes in the chief executive.
4 Given the limited variation over time in the TOR variable, a panel data approach is not helpful in the
present context.
5 Part of this data set (referring to 1980-89 only) has already been used in De Haan and Kooi (2000).
6 The underlying data (on an annual basis) are available upon request.
7 Due to the possibly large degree of multicollinearity in these powers, Lee, White and Granger (1993)
suggest using reconstructed powers on principal components, excluding the first and largest one.
8 The test statistic for row 1 in table is e.g. 1.947 (significance level: 0.15).
9 See table A2 in the Appendix for further details.